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Abstract 
The CIS trade regime can be characterised as a mix of, partly overlapping, weak, bilateral, sub-
regional, and multilateral agreements. This is a result of the design of the CIS, which was explicitly 
constructed to allow its member states to participate in only those parts that they deemed in their best 
interest and not to participate in other parts. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union forced the successor states to create a trade regime. Initially, they 
turned to one another not to disrupt trade any more than needed. However, Russia carried most of the 
financial burden of the initial arrangements and started to push for bilateral agreements. The others 
followed this example, but were careful not to commit too much sovereignty in these agreements. At a 
later stage, sub-regional agreements substituted for the CIS framework as well. 
The CIS states remained ambivalent, however, to submit too much sovereignty, whereas Russia 
formally stayed out of the multilateral free trade agreements altogether. The countries did work 
together multilaterally and committed themselves to these agreements where it concerned specific 
issues. 
In this paper, we look for causes of the myriad of agreements in the actual economic developments. 
We will therefore present and discuss the major trade agreements with economic arguments. We will 
also briefly discuss the developments in the volume and direction of trade. Although we expect the 
gradual improvement of the agreements and the ‘rationalisation’ of the complex arrangement, we do 
not foresee a consolidated ‘hard’ multilateral framework in the short or even medium term.  
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Introduction 
 
Fifteen years into independence, the 12 successor states of the Soviet Union that formed the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are still working out a new equilibrium for their mutual 
relations. It is unclear, however, whether there actually is a role for the CIS in that new equilibrium. 
Member states feel weary of Russia’s dominant position within the CIS and they are afraid that Russia will 
use its economic importance to establish a political and strategic dominance in the region, and undermine 
their newly acquired independence (Larrabee, 2001, Sushko, 2004). Russia also shows an ambivalent 
attitude towards the CIS. 
The ambivalent attitude towards the CIS in the member states and their inexperience in developing an 
institutional regime for economic cooperation, as well as the continuously changing external and domestic 
environment resulted in a myriad of multilateral and bilateral agreements of very diverse quality between 
the CIS states. Grinberg (2005) estimates that 90 per cent of all multilateral documents that create the 
legal base of the CIS, and there are more than 1,000 of them, are ineffective. According to many 
observers, the CIS seems to have failed in becoming an effective framework of economic cooperation and 
(re)integration (Stroev et al., 1999). The fascination with the failure of the CIS, however, distracts the 
attention from the economic cooperation that does occur between the former Soviet republics, and from 
the institutional forms that it takes. 
The agreements that are concluded often are partial and selective, while their ratification and 
implementation also is a mixed affair; but this does not imply that they do not have any value. What can 
be observed in the CIS is that economic cooperation takes the form of overlapping bilateral and 
multilateral agreements of very distinct legal quality. From an economic point of view it does not make 
sense that countries that have concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in 
1994, an agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral free trade agreements with 
their partners as well. It creates overlap, it increases transaction costs, and it obfuscates the status of both 
the multilateral and the bilateral agreement. In this paper, we seek to discuss the functional value of such 
an approach. We look for reasons for the behaviour of the CIS countries. First, we will summarise the 
legal framework. We will also discuss the economic questions that trade agreements seek to address. We 
will continue by discussing the rationale that might explain why the CIS countries continue to work 
together and the forms they seek to do so. Because Russia is the most important country in the CIS, we 
will focus on Russia’s position. We conclude that the CIS still provide benefits to the CIS countries, but 
that it is still open whether or not that will continue to be so. 
 
 
A summary of the legal framework1 
 
One of the declared goals of the CIS was to maintain the pre-existing economic unity while placing inter-
state relations on the basis of respect of sovereignty and mutual benefit. Since the CIS no longer was a 
single legal unity, the legal nature of the CIS trade regime had to be based on the international law of 
treaties and the mechanism for their transformation into the respective domestic legal orders.2 There are a 
number of qualifications of particular importance in the CIS context. First, the CIS applies the ‘interested 
party’ principle, which implies that a state could choose not to participate in a certain agreement or 
decision without afflicting its validity. Each member is thus able to construct for itself a regime that 
corresponds best to its interests. However, the lack of even a minimum set of instruments which 
members are required to join works against the logic of common commitment needed for a robust 
                                                 
1  This section is based on Dragneva and DeKort (2007). 
2  All CIS members are party to the Vienna Convention on the International Law Treaties of 1969. 
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regional economic integration. Second, many of the CIS multilateral agreements are signed under 
reservations. These are a legitimate international law instrument used to limit the binding effect of 
agreements for the party that makes them. Third, the CIS members prefer to conclude a large number of 
international agreements – framework or general agreements as well as more specific-issue ones – rather 
than to adopt a limited number of comprehensive, detailed agreements. This approach allows the CIS 
members to pursue a project by gradually building consensus for the next steps, which is particularly 
important in a setting with a pronounced diversity of members. With the ‘interesting party’ principle it 
allows the member states a greater possibility to pick and mix with reference to their differing sensitivities 
and concerns, while keeping the whole project on course. On the other hand, the fragmentation poses a 
danger of rule clashes, patchy implementation, and a non-transparent and complex administration of the 
regime. Finally, the founding documents of the CIS refer to both multilateral and bilateral agreements as 
instruments for cooperation. In case of overlap, such as in case of the trade regime, this gives rise to the 
question about the interaction of the bilateral and multilateral regimes, and about the legal device that 
need to be put in place to deal with possible conflicts. 
The charter of the CIS did not create an extensive organisational structure. Initially, only the Council of 
Heads of State and the Council of the Heads of Government were given the power to adopt decisions. As 
indicated above, the member states have options to selectively adopt decisions. Therefore, the Councils 
need to ‘rule’ by consensus and use a political road to enforcement rather than a legal one. The evaluation 
of the decisions by the Councils is complicated because decisions sometimes have the status of an 
international agreement, but more often, decisions are of a declaratory and political nature (Dragneva, 
2004). The distinction between ‘normative’ decisions and ‘political’ decisions often is quite fuzzy in the 
CIS. Other CIS bodies were initiated at a later stage and include the Inter-State Economic Committee 
(IEC) and the Economic Council and a number of branch organisations. The IEC existed between 1994 
and 1999 and reflected the short-lived impulse for an enhanced EU style cooperation. It did receive the 
right to adopt executive decisions in the area of transferred competence, but its successor, the Economic 
Council reverted back to the consensus rules. Its most important task relates to preparing draft 
international agreements in the area of trade cooperation to be approved by the Councils of Heads of 
State and Government. Two branch organisations deserve mentioning. The Intergovernmental Council 
on Standardisation, Metrology and Certification is charged with decision making powers related to the 
harmonisation of CIS standards and their adaptation to international requirements, and the Council of the 
Heads of Customs Services was entrusted with powers related to the coordination of customs policies and 
the work of national customs services, the harmonisation of customs legislation and the preparation of 
the common customs tariff for the attainment of a customs union. The latter one had the scope of its 
powers reduced in 2002, reflecting the mitigated agenda for economic cooperation in the CIS. 
As indicated above, the CIS presents a mix of, often overlapping, bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
The picture gets even more complicated as bilateral and multilateral agreements often differ in the 
strength of commitment they require from the signatories. Bilateral agreements rarely envision a 
mechanism for resolving disputes between its parties, relying on negotiations to do so. Multilateral 
agreements on the other hand often do attempt to strengthen the bindingness of the commitments 
undertaken. In 1993, the Treaty of the Economic Union even went as far as to strengthen the role of the 
Economic Court, by requiring that ‘if the Economic Court recognises that […] a member state has not 
fulfilled its obligation ensuing from the Treaty, this state is obliged to take measures connected with the 
implementation of the decision of the Economic Court’.3 A year later, in 1994, a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) was concluded which ‘undermines’ the position of the Economic Court as it introduces alternative 
                                                 
3  Treaty on the Economic Union, 1993, art. 31. The Economic Court itself was created in 1992, by a special 
agreement with the mandate of ensuring the uniform application of the agreement of the CIS and the economic 
obligations and contracts based on them. Its decisions were not binding, but were recommended for adoption by 
the country found in violation. 
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instruments, conciliation and international juridical procedures, for dispute settlement. The FTA of 1999 
avoids any explicit reference to the Economic Court altogether. Not many cases have been brought to the 
Economic Court and its future position is unclear. The CIS Heads of State announced, in 2005, an 
initiative to enhance the institutional profile of the Economic Court, but only one year earlier, one of the 
most pro-integrationist politicians in the CIS, Kazakh president Nazarbayev, declared that nobody anyway 
pays any attention to the decisions adopted by the Court. 
Agreements on specific issues often, but definitely not always, contain conflict avoiding clauses, whereby 
their provisions ‘do not affect’ the provisions of other international agreements in which the parties 
participate. The 1994 and 1999 FTA contain a conflict clause, whereby nothing in these agreements 
‘prevents any of the contracting parties form implementing the obligations under other agreements in 
which the contraction parties participate or can participate as long they do not contradict the provisions 
and objectives of this agreement’. They thus allow for supplementing agreements, adopted either earlier or 
later. 
The CIS trade regime can be described as a symbiosis between bilateral and multilateral regimes, both of 
which can be described as weak regimes. Bilateral agreements cover some key free trade rules, such as 
tariffs, but remain minimal and quite basic. Non-tariff barriers, for instance, are generally left out, as are 
liberalisation of services or intellectual property to name a few issues that have become important in 
international trade agreements. Disputes are generally resolved through consultations. Over the years, 
some improvements of the quality of the provisions of bilateral agreements can be observed, most clearly 
in the increasing number of references to related GATT/WTO regulations. Multilateral agreements, as 
indicated, reached further from the beginning, both in terms of comprehensiveness, quality of rules and 
the provision for greater credibility of commitments. But the dispute settlement again is left to 
consultations. Here too, improvements can be observed over the years, most notably in the 1999 revision 
of the FTA of 1994.  
 
 
A civilised divorce 
 
In the Soviet Union, foreign trade was part of the central plan and foreign trade organisations negotiated 
with exporters about the terms of delivery. Because the rouble was inconvertible, trade was concluded in 
foreign currencies or in barter. With the partners in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 
trade was concluded in so-called transfer roubles and most trade balances were cleared bilaterally. Trade 
between the Union Republics, of course, was not registered as foreign trade, but was part of the annual 
planning process. It is difficult to evaluate the intra-republican ‘trade balances’ as prices did not reflect 
scarcity and transport costs were negligible. In an attempt to determine the intra-republican trade 
balances, Van Selm (1997) reports that Russia and Turkmenistan registered a trade surplus, but all others 
registered trade deficits.4 These trade surpluses did not lead to financial claims on the other republics, the 
surplus countries effectively subsidising the deficit countries. Furthermore, to facilitate the planning 
process production had been concentrated in large production units and to minimize the dependency on 
the procurement system, ministries had developed a conglomerate structure, with little respect for 
efficiency considerations, nor for the borders between the republics. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, intra-republican trade became trade between sovereign states. 
The ministerial conglomerates were also broken up, leaving their parts scattered over the new countries, 
and to continue production, the enterprises needed to trade internationally. The absence of a centrally 
planned foreign trade regime furthermore reduced the opportunity to balance the balance of payment. 
                                                 
4   Van Selm uses world market prices for the trade balances. He acknowledges that calculations in domestic prices 
would give trade surpluses for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, but not for Turkmenistan. 
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Trade balances were to result in financial claims or obligations. Therefore, the successor states needed to 
create a financial system to process all payments related to foreign trade. To facilitate trade, the CIS 
countries, in a multilateral agreement, decided not to break up the monetary union and to continue the 
rouble as their common currency.5 (With due notice, countries could leave the rouble zone.) Maintaining 
the rouble, however, proved to be detrimental to Russia’s anti-inflation policy. The central banks of the 
newly independent states extended unlimited credits to importing firms and Russia continued to have 
balance of payment surpluses. Effectively, the situation that existed in the Soviet Union, where trade 
deficits did not result in a financial obligation for the importing union-republics (now countries), 
continued to exist. The trade credits of the other CIS central banks ended up with the Central Bank of 
Russia (CBR) thus fuelling Russia’s inflation. In response, Russia tried to reign the automatic crediting by 
introducing so called ‘technical credits’, which were subject to negotiation as an alternative for the 
automatic credits to the other CIS states that resulted from the trade surpluses (Granville, 1995). This 
Russian policy marked the beginning of the end for the rouble zone. To become independent of Russia’s 
credit conditions, the other states started to create their own currencies. The end of the rouble zone 
signalled Russia’s interest in an independent trade policy and an independent monetary policy. It also 
forced the other countries to rethink their trade policies as they could no longer shift the bill for trade 
deficits to Russia. 
The governments of the successor states anticipated that the liberalization of prices and trade, at the 
beginning of 1992, would give rise to steep price increases. To ease the adjustment of enterprises and 
consumers to higher prices, many countries issued price controls. Because the level of controls differed 
between the countries export restrictions were placed on price controlled commodities to prevent these 
goods from being exported (Tarr and Michalopoulos, 1994). This, together with the deep economic crises 
that substantially reduced demand overall, reduced trade considerably. The successor states reacted by 
setting up a network of intergovernmental, bilateral barter trade for a number of important products on a 
so-called obligatory list. Products included energy, raw materials and foodstuffs. This system was similar 
to the one used for trade within the CMEA, and tried to establish bilateral current account equilibrium. 
For a further, indicative, list of products that was deemed important for domestic consumption and for 
hard currency exports, export licenses and quotas were introduced. This list included intermediate 
products and consumer goods. Within the limits of the licenses and quotas, enterprises could trade these 
products and determine the conditions for sale. Both the products on the obligatory list and the indicative 
list and the conditions for those products were negotiated in bilateral agreements to fit the trade relations 
between both countries. Trade for products that are not on the obligatory or the indicative lists became 
unrestricted. 
The return to bilateral barter agreements and the end of the rouble zone enforced Russia’s position. 
Given its trade surplus with all other CIS countries, Russia already had a dominant position in the trade 
relations with the other countries and Russia found it easier to get its ways in bilateral agreements than in 
a multilateral setting. In the second half of 1992, Russia concluded bilateral agreements with eight of the 
other 11 CIS countries. See table 1. 
 
                                                 
5  The IMF also advised, in October 1991, to maintain the ruble zone. See for a discussion on the IMF and the 
Ruble Zone a collection of papers in a Symposium Issue of Comparative Economic Studies, Vol XLIV, No. 4 
Winter 2002. 
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Table 1: Bilateral Free Trade Agreements between CIS countries 
 
 AM AZ BY GE KZ KG MD RU TJ TM UA UZ 
AM X - 2000 1995 yes 1994 yes 1992 yes - 1994 yes 
AZ  X - 1996 1997 - 1995 1992 - 1996 1995 1996 
BY   X - 1997 1996 1993 1992 1998 - 1992 - 
GE    X 1997 1995 1997 1994 - 1996 1995 1995 
KZ     X 1995 yes 1992 yes - yes 1997 
KG      X 1995 1992 - - 1995 1998 
MD       X 1993 yes yes 2003 yes 
RU        X 1992 1992 1993 1992 
TJ         X - 2001 1996 
TM          X 1994 1996 
UA           X 1994 
UZ            X 
 
Sources: Authors compilation from accession reports on the WTO website; national sources; and World Bank studies. For 
some of the FTA’s, it is not clear when they are concluded. 
 The abbreviations used read as follows: AM – Armenia, AZ – Azerbaijan, BY – Belarus, GE – Georgia, KG – 
Kyrgyzstan, KZ – Kazakhstan, MD – Moldova, RU – Russian Federation, TM – Turkmenistan, TJ – Tajikistan, 
UA – Ukraine, UZ – Uzbekistan. 
 
With Moldova and Ukraine such agreements were concluded in 1993, while an agreement with Georgia 
followed in 1994. These bilateral agreements were free trade agreements (FTA) that included abolition of 
customs duties, taxes and levies of equivalent effect on the export and import of commodities, but 
allowed for quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect. Protocols were added to 
negotiate exemptions. The above mentioned bilateral agreements regarding products on the obligatory 
and the indicative list became part of so-called Trade and Cooperation Agreements that were signed 
together with the FTAs and were to be renewed on an annual basis to allow for changes in the obligatory 
and indicative lists. 
The events in 1992 also marked a significant change from the intended multilateral cooperation towards a 
Russian induced bilateral approach. The CIS member states concluded several multilateral agreements to 
preserve the benefits of a single economic space, but they were unsuccesful. Some elements of multilateral 
cooperation, however, continued to exist. The break-up had forced all newly independent states to build 
an entirely new customs regime. They had to develop customs procedures and a nomenclature for their 
products as enterprises became free to source their inputs and sell their outputs irrespective of a central 
plan. They also had to decide whether or not to introduce import tariffs and for which products if they 
did. As part of this exercise, CIS countries, in 1992, concluded several specific multilateral agreements to 
facilitate trade and transit, among which the agreement on Standardisation, Metrology and Certification. 
In response to Russia’s policy of bilateralism, the other CIS states also started to conclude bilateral 
agreements to create a network of bilateral free trade agreements. (See table 1.) Initially, these agreements 
followed the Russian format, with a free trade agreement and accompanying trade and cooperation 
agreements. Because in these accompanying agreements, countries excluded the most important sectors 
of their economies, it was impossible to link the network of bilateral agreements into a single free trade 
area. It is important to note that the wave of bilateralism did not end multilateralism. A multilateral free 
trade agreement was concluded in 1994. In it, the signatories agreed to eliminate the exemptions that were 
part of the bilateral agreements and to adopt a single list of exemptions. In this way, the bilateral 
agreements would gradually merge into a single multilateral free trade agreement. The countries, however, 
were not willing to give up their reservations and, therefore, the 1994 FTA remained a paper agreement 
mainly. It is to be noted that Russia failed to ratify the agreement altogether, although it did declare 
temporary application. In this way, Russia was unbound to the FTA and could decide whether and when 
to adhere to the obligations of the agreement. The CIS member states also continued to conclude specific 
issue agreements. 
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Increased independence 
 
The Soviet Union had been a closed economy. At the time of the break up, trade predominantly was with 
other CIS countries; almost 90 per cent of all trade was within the CIS. See table 2.  
 
Table 2: Share of CIS trade (exports plus imports) in total trade  
 
 1988* 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 
        
Armenia 0.89 0.62 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.21 
of which to RF  0.61 0.55 0.75 0.74 0.65 0.73 
Azerbaijan 0.86 0.54 0.40 0.38 0.21 0.23 0.23 
of which to RF  0.41 0.43 0.47 0.57 0.42 0.45 
Belarus 0.86 0.72 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.63 0.63 
of which to RF  0.81 0.80 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.94 
Georgia 0.86 - 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.37 
of which to RF  - 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.37 0.39 
Kazakhstan 0.86 0.65 0.61 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.32 
of which to RF  0.73 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.77 0.76 
Kyrgyzstan 0.87 0.73 0.65 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.47 
of which to RF  0.31 0.35 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.45 
Moldova 0.88 0.80 0.64 0.53 0.43 0.54 0.46 
of which to RF  0.61 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.52 0.49 
Russia 0.58 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.18 
Tajikistan 0.86 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.64 0.50 0.44 
of which to RF  0.28 0.21 0.21 0.39 0.34 0.31 
Turkmenistan 0.89 0.74 0.51 0.39 - - - 
of which to RF  0.07 0.20 0.26 - - - 
Ukraine 0.79 0.65 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 
of which to RF  0.80 0.77 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.74 
Uzbekistan 0.86 0.62 0.40 - - - - 
of which to RF  0.50 0.57 - - - - 
 
Sources: own calculations on CIS statistical yearbooks, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003. Tables: Eksportno-importnie 
operatsii gosudarstv sodruzjestva; *Van Selm, 1997, table 4.3 
 
 
An exception has to be made for Russia, which already traded more extensively with other countries, 
although mostly with the partners of the CMEA. As is indicated in table 2, the share of CIS trade in total 
trade gradually declines in the 1990s. In 2003, the share of CIS trade in total trade was between 21 per 
cent (Armenia) and 63 per cent (Belarus) with Russia again being the exception at a level of 17 per cent. 
As before, Russia still is the most important trading partner within the CIS and its share of CIS trade 
remains fairly constant since the dissolution of the CIS. Using a gravity approach towards trade, several 
authors expect an even larger decline of intra-CIS trade (Djankov and Freund, 2003, Elborgh-Woytek, 
2003) Trade shares, however, seem to have stabilised, with some countries actually trading relatively more 
with other CIS countries in recent years. The gravity approach seems to underestimate the importance of 
the historical and institutional commonness of the CIS. 
This notwithstanding, intra-CIS trade has declined considerably and the member states are trading more 
in the world market than ever before. It is, therefore, not surprising that all but Turkmenistan have 
applied for WTO membership. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan already have acquired 
membership. Neither is it surprising that the member states have become more selective with respect to 
obligations that they are willing to accept within the CIS. But it did not stop them entirely. Although a 
multilateral free trade area itself was not created in 1994, the CIS states continued to work together to 
move towards that end. They concluded several multilateral agreements that all member states signed and 
ratified, but continued to follow a pragmatic approach. They accepted what they considered beneficial and 
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did not participate if it did not service their goals. It is interesting to note that it became more difficult to 
get unanimous support for agreements, even if they were of a technical nature. Initially, the more 
technical trade issues such as standards and certification, simplification and unification of procedures for 
customs clearance at borders, the single commodities nomenclature, transit through the CIS countries, 
and so on were accepted unanimously. Later agreements generally are not ratified by all CIS members, 
even if they are of a more technical nature. See table 3. 
 
Table 3: Key multilateral agreements in force related to CIS free trade  
 
Multi-lateral agreements AM AZ BY GE KG KZ MD RU TM TJ UA UZ 
 
General (framework) agreements  
            
On the Principles of Customs Policy, 
13.03.1992 
s – R – – s s s s R – R 
Treaty on the Economic Union, 
24.09.1993  
R R R R R R R R R R – R 
On the Free Trade Area, 15.04.1994  R R R R R R R s s R R R 
Protocol Amending the Agreement on 
the Free Trade Area, 2.04.1999 
R R R R R R R s – R R R 
 
Specific issue agreements  
            
On Standardization, Metrology and 
Certification, 13.03.1992 
R R R R R R R R R R R R 
On Rules of Origin, 
24.09.1993(Decision) 
R R R – R R R R R R R R 
On the Re-export of Goods, 
15.04.1994 
R R R s R R s R s R s R 
On Co-operation in Customs Affairs, 
15.04.1994 
R R R s R R R R s R R R 
On the Foundations of Customs 
Legislation, 10.02.1995 (Decision) 
s R R s R R s R – R s R 
On the Single Commodities 
Nomenclature, 3.11.1995  
R R R R R R R R R R R* R 
On The Principles of Indirect 
Taxation, 25.11.1998 
R R R s R – R – R R – – 
On Rules of Transit, 4.06.1999 R R R s s R R R – R R s 
On the Procedure for Customs 
Clearance and Customs Control, 
8.10.1999 
R R s s R R R R – R R s 
On the Technical Barriers in the Free 
Trade Area, 20.06.2000 
R R R s R R R s – R s s 
On Rules on Origin, 30.11.2000 
(Decision) 
R R R R R R R R – R R – 
On the Rules for Licensing Imports, 
30.11.2000 (Protocol) 
R R R s s s – s – R R – 
 
Source:  Own compilation. 
 s – signed (acceded); R – ratified (or other transformation procedure); – neither; R* - denounced participation 
 
In 1999, a second attempt to a multilateral free trade agreement was agreed upon, when the CIS member 
states signed a protocol amending the 1994 FTA. This protocol is more explicit with regard to the 
elimination of exemptions than the FTA of 1994 in that it requires the member states to conclude new 
bilateral protocols within twelve months with the purpose of agreeing schedules for gradual elimination of 
existing exemptions. It prohibited the introduction of any barriers in addition to the ones agreed in earlier 
bilateral documents. Furthermore, it shows that the CIS members are becoming part of the world 
economy. In line with rules of GATT/WTO, the 1999 FTA laid down that exemptions to the trade 
regime should not be applied on an arbitrary or discriminatory base. Finally, the protocol defines 
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quantitative restrictions and other measures of equivalent effect, which in the FTA of 1994 were left out. 
The 1999 FTA shared the same destiny as its predecessor because Russia, still the most important 
member of the CIS, again preferred to keep its options open and did not ratify the agreement. Russia 
again did declare temporary application. 
Russia’s reservation towards common policies is illustrated very well in its policy towards indirect 
taxation. With respect to the Value Added Tax (VAT), the international practice is to apply the destination 
principle; taxes are levied in the country of final consumption. Exporting countries, therefore, have to 
reimburse the VAT that they may have collected already if a product crosses its border. Of course, it may 
collect taxes on the full value of the imports. For countries with a balance of payment equilibrium, the 
loss of taxes through exports is compensated by the gain of taxes on imports. Using the destination 
principle creates a level playing field between imported goods and locally produced goods. Russia, 
however, has a large balance of payment surplus and therefore prefers to use the origin principle, in which 
the country in which the product is produced collects the VAT. Its exports then are taxed. Any value that 
is subsequently added to the imports in the importing country automatically fall in the new tariff regime 
of the importing country and the tax authorities only have to monitor the value that is added in domestic 
companies (Baer et al., 1996, Shiells, 2005). If indirect taxes are similar between trading partners and there 
is balance of payment equilibrium it does not make a difference which principle prevails, but, as indicated 
above, Russia has a balance of payment surplus with the CIS countries. Applying the destination principle 
in the VAT, would allow the importing countries to tax value that was actually added in Russia. In that 
way Russia  indirectly subsidises the importing countries. 
The application of the destination principle does, however, require a well functioning customs registration 
to enable the products to leave a country free of VAT. As indicated above, the CIS countries started their 
existence without any borders at all and without such a customs registration system. It, therefore, made 
sense that the CIS countries decided to introduce a dual system. They applied the origin principle for 
trade to and from other CIS countries, and used the destination principle for trade with the rest of the 
world. With the introduction of a customs regime it became possible to apply the destination principle 
and gradually, during the 1990s, the CIS countries switched to the destination principle for trade with the 
CIS as well. Given its trade surpluses, Russia was reluctant to follow and continued to use the origin 
principle until 2001, and then only for its non-energy exports. This resulted in Russian imports often 
being taxed twice, depressing trade. In 2004, energy trade was brought under the destination principle as 
well. This did not prevent Russia to levy export taxes on its energy exports. 
The increased independence of the CIS member states towards each other and towards Russia also shows 
in sub-regional undertakings. Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, in 1996 created 
GUUAM with the intention of creating a free trade area. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and 
Tajikistan, in 2000, created the Eurasian Economic Community with a similar goal, and Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, in 2003 created the Single Economic Space, with the signatories 
disagreeing on the ultimate goal. We will leave the discussion of these regional agreements and their 
importance for the CIS for another paper. Suffice it at this point, that these sub-regional agreements 
further complicate the view on the trade regimes in the CIS. 
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A view of the future 
 
The confusing pattern of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements induced the UNECE (2005) and 
Freinkman et al. (2004) to advise renegotiation of free trade agreements, particularly moving from a 
system of bilateral free trade agreements to an effective multilateral agreement and to replace the 
‘spaghetti bowl’ of transit and customs agreements by straightforward and clear multilateral ones That is 
easier said than done. The Soviet Union was a union after all, even if it was economically inefficient, and 
both the legal and the economic ties needed to be dissociated. This required a multilateral approach and 
the CIS is often regarded as the best institution to oversee such a civilised divorce. The member states 
acknowledged the benefits of economic cooperation much in the same way that member states of 
numerous free trade agreements do. 
The CIS was burdened with ambivalent goals. On the one hand, it aimed to assist the newly independent 
countries to gain economic independence, while on the other hand it was the intended institution to bring 
the newly independent states together in an economic union. The ambivalent character of the CIS, and 
the increasing self-consciousness, both politically and economically, of the newly independent states, 
resulted in numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements at the same time. It will be interesting to see 
whether the more recently concluded sub-regional agreements will circumvent the ambiguous character of 
the CIS. 
Arguably, Russia was and is the most important country in the CIS. It continued to be the major trading 
partner for all other CIS countries and it continued to subsidise the other member states. Initially, the 
rouble zone allowed the trade deficit countries to pass the bill to Russia, but even after the rouble zone 
was broken up, Russia continued to subsidise the other CIS member states as it still exported energy to its 
CIS partners at favourable prices.6 Russia’s position was crucial in the developments of the CIS. It put an 
end to the rouble zone, it did not ratify the FTA’s, it was the first to conclude bilateral FTA’s, and it was 
the last to change to the destination principle in its treatment of indirect tax on exports. It does so in its 
economic interests, and it is powerful enough to get its way. The other countries cannot afford to ignore 
Russia’s position. It is still unclear what type of economic cooperation will remain between the CIS 
countries and what the level and direction of trade between them will be. More research is needed to 
discuss the economic relations between the member states.  
The ambivalence that is built in the CIS, with its pick and mix construction, and the importance of 
Russia’s position in the CIS induced the mixture of agreements that many observers find disturbing. But 
there are benefits as well. The plethora of options in cooperation and the weakness of the agreements 
allow member states to dissociate themselves from their past and at the same time associate themselves 
with their partners. Whether developments in the trade regime will evolve towards the advised increase in 
coherence is to be awaited. The evidence is mixed. The CIS countries are reluctant to commit themselves 
to ‘hard’ arrangements and remain wary of Russia’s dominance. Russia itself seems to dissociate itself 
from its partners, without severing the ties. But new initiatives for cooperation keep appearing and the 
CIS countries seem to realise that there are still gains in regional cooperation. We do not, however, expect 
any consolidated multilateral cooperation either in the short or medium term. It is to be noted though, 
that, for example, the WTO took 50 years to gradually develop into its current structure, and that its 
structure still evolves. 
                                                 
6  In 2004, CIS states pay a little over 50 US$ (contractual prices including tax and charges) per 1000 cubic meter 
(cm) for Russian gas, whereas western European countries pay 140 US$ per 1000 cm. This includes excise tax 
and customs duties (see Stern, 2005). 
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